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Abstract: Scholarship on centre-periphery relations in Indonesia is often rooted in an 
epistemology of that derives from the institutions and knowledge practices of the modern 
state.  This has left Indonesianists are well-positioned to appreciate the impacts of 
decentralisation and regional autonomy upon statecraft and political movements, but only 
partially aware of how such reforms have affected ‘the construction of marginality’ (Haug et 
al, this volume) in its broadest sense. This chapter expands the conversation  by giving 
centre-stage to the political imaginations of people who rarely talked about centre-periphery 
relations, but nevertheless revealed themselves to be profoundly invested in them. These 
investments came to the fore in intense, affectively charged moments, the study of which 
reveals that decentralisation can be as much about the desire for connection as it can be about 
autonomy; that life in a borderland can engender distinctive responsibilities towards a centre; 
and that the bodily and psychic legacies of past marginality continue to stand out as problems 
in the decentralised present. Such material indicates that we should avoid any hasty 
conclusions about the ‘effects’ of decentralisation, as if administrative reforms in and of 
themselves are capable of creating new ‘centre-periphery relations’. My argument instead is 
that decentralisation has created new conditions of possibility under which Indonesians can 
attempt to realise the imaginaries of ‘centre-periphery relations’ that are meaningful and 
desirable to them. Affects and ethics underpinning local ideas about how Indonesia’s 
periphery should relate to its centre should therefore take centre-stage in analysis. 
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The Riau Archipelago is a place where people love to talk about centres and peripheries. 
When I told Pak Iman, a politics lecturer at a local university, that I was writing a paper on 
the topic, he almost fell off his chair. ‘It’s the most interesting thing you’ve ever worked on!’ 
he exclaimed, ‘That’s a paper I definitely want to read.’ He went on to outline many issues 
that my paper could potentially address. The new regional autonomy laws had made centre-
periphery relations a ‘hot topic’, with intense debate surrounding the administrative 
ambiguities they had precipitated. Who, for example, had the authority to issue a contract for 
bauxite mining in the newly created Riau Islands Province (popularly and hereafter known as 
Kepri): the local district heads, the governor, or the central ministries in Jakarta? A local 
district head had recently redrawn the boundaries of a protected forest to facilitate resource 
extraction – but was this really within his jurisdiction? These were the kinds of issues, Pak 
Iman felt, where research was desperately required. 
 Vina, a local historian, was hoping I would write an account grounded in the longue 
durée. The Riau Islands had, she noted, once been a major centre in and of themselves: in the 
seventeenth century the island of Bintan had hosted one of the liveliest trading posts in 
Southeast Asia, whilst the sultan’s and viceroy’s palaces on Lingga and Bintan had been the 
epicentres of one of the Malay World’s most important indigenous polities. Yet, after the 
territory encompassed by this sultanate was bifurcated by the 1824 Treaty of London, the 
Riau Islands had become a marginal backwater within the Dutch East Indies, their strategic 
significance rapidly eclipsed by the rise of Singapore. Things had changed further during the 
twentieth century, as the archipelago witnessed waves of migration from all across Indonesia: 
its low levels of conflict, numerous job opportunities (in factories, mining, and small-scale 
entrepreneurship), and widespread circulation of strong Singaporean and Malaysian currency 
all attracting Indonesians in search of a new beginning. Others still hoped to use Kepri as a 
stepping-stone to migrant work overseas, but ended up getting stuck. As a consequence of 
these demographic shifts (described in more detail in Long 2013: 30-43), the islands boasted 
an impressively multicultural population. However, this in itself led many Riau Malays – 
who conceptualised themselves as the ‘indigenous people’ of the region – to feel they had 
become peripheral. The 2010 census estimated Malays to make up less than 30 per cent of the 
province’s population – just 14.4 per cent in the city of Batam (Minnesota Population Center 
2011) – and many will not even have been ‘indigenous’ Riau Malays, but migrants from 
Borneo, Bangka-Belitung, or the Sumatran Mainland. For Vina, then, the possibilities 
afforded by regional autonomy – most especially the formation of a new province, created ‘in 
the name of the Malay people’ – were important precisely because they allowed Kepri and its 
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Malays to be ‘at the centre’ of something once again. This, she thought, would be a good 
story to tell in my paper. I could even note how a handful of Riau Islanders were going even 
further and arguing that Kepri should detach from Indonesia altogether, forming a new 
Republic of Riau, or reconnecting with the Singaporean and/or South Malaysian territories 
over which it had once presided (see Faucher 2005).  
 If Pak Iman or Vina ever read this paper, they may be disappointed. The issues they 
flag are interesting, certainly, but they are stories that have already been told elsewhere.1 
More significantly, they are quite problematic stories to reiterate yet again. Vina’s narrative 
risks overstating the extent to which the history of the Malay World shapes contemporary 
political imaginations, and thereby silencing the migrant majority whose claims to place are 
grounded in principles of citizenship, rather than autochthony (Long 2013). Pak Iman’s 
research agenda reflects genuine problems that are much discussed amongst Kepri’s educated 
elite: academics, civil servants, journalists and activists. However, the vast majority of Riau 
Islanders are far too preoccupied with the mundane business of everyday life to give such 
matters much thought, and so an investigation into those issues would do little to capture 
what either decentralisation or the simple fact of living in the Outer Islands means to them. 
Even when people offer up narratives like Vina’s or Pak Iman’s, these may not be the only 
(or even the most important) ways in which they think and feel about their position in 
Indonesia’s geographic margins – they may simply be the most familiar and most readily 
articulated narratives available. This would not be surprising: both narratives ultimately have 
their roots in an epistemology of centre-periphery relations that derives from the institutions 
and knowledge practices of the modern state, and so reflect stories that informants with 
backgrounds in the civil service or political activism have been trained to know how to tell. 
Problems arise, however, when a similar bias is replicated within academic approaches to 
centre-periphery relations – and as I will demonstrate within this paper, that very much 
remains the case. The result is a situation in which Indonesianists are well-positioned to 
appreciate the impacts of decentralisation upon statecraft and political movements, but have 
achieved only a partial grasp of how Indonesia’s recent transformations have affected ‘the 
construction of marginality’ (Haug et al, this volume) in its broadest sense. 
 I therefore want to use this chapter to expand the conversation, by giving centre-stage 
to the political imaginations of people who did not often talk about centre-periphery relations, 
but who nevertheless revealed themselves to be profoundly invested in them. These 
investments came to the fore in intense, affectively charged moments, the study of which 
reveals that decentralisation can be as much about the desire for connection as it can be about 
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autonomy; that life in a borderland can engender distinctive responsibilities towards a centre; 
and that the bodily and psychic legacies of past marginality continue to stand out as problems 
in the decentralised present. Taken as a whole, the material indicates that we should avoid 
any hasty conclusions about the ‘effects’ of decentralisation, as if administrative reforms in 
and of themselves are capable of creating new ‘centre-periphery relations’. My argument 
instead is that decentralisation has created new conditions of possibility under which 
Indonesians can attempt to realise the imaginaries of ‘centre-periphery relations’ that are 
meaningful and desirable to them – and that the affects and ethics that underpin local ideas 
how Indonesia’s periphery should relate to its centre should therefore take centre-stage in 
analysis. Although the chapter concentrates exclusively on the Riau Island case, this broader 
theoretical argument would apply to any of the regions discussed in this volume. 
 
Metanarratives of Marginality: A Critical Review 
To date, much writing on centre-periphery relations in Indonesia has been inflected by 
theoretical models associated with structural Marxism, especially Wallerstein’s (2004) 
‘world-systems theory’, which draws a sharp analytic distinction between regions that can be 
designated as ‘the core’ – those that hold the greatest amount of economic power – and the 
‘peripheries’ which supply resources, commodities and manpower to that core (Pitzl 2004: 
38). The core-periphery relation is thus conceptualised as an inherently antagonistic one 
marked by domination and exploitation. Indeed, some scholars who built on Wallerstein’s 
framework (e.g. Hechter 1975) included in their models not only a description of 
expropriation, but accompanying cultural denigration and political marginalisation of the 
‘periphery’ by the central ‘core’ or ‘metropole’ as well.  
 This analytic vocabulary of periphery and centre/core/metropole has given rise to 
several patterns in academic approaches to ‘centre-periphery relations’ in Indonesia. Some 
scholars, most notably those affiliated with the discipline of economic geography, have been 
concerned with mapping the changing configurations of ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ as economic 
relations in Southeast Asia have become increasingly transnational under a regime of 
globalised ‘late capitalism’. This question is particularly complex in the Riau Archipelago 
given the creation of an international ‘Growth Triangle’ scheme between Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Singapore, in which the Riau Islands serve as a cross-border ‘hinterland’ for Singapore. 
Factories set up on the islands combine Singaporean management expertise with cheap 
Indonesian land and labour, offering an attractive package to clients, whilst Singapore has 
access to some of Bintan’s plentiful natural resources, most notably its scenic northern 
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coastline (now developed into an ‘international resort area’) and its water.  Scholars were 
quick to identify this as a ‘cross-border hinterlandisation’ of Singapore’s economy (Bunnell 
et al. 2012: 466); a sign that the Riau Islands had become a periphery to Singapore’s centre, 
even as this process was being carefully managed by the central Indonesian government in 
Jakarta (Phelps 2004: 217).   
Such analyses have certainly led to the development of increasingly subtle and 
complex renderings of the means by which the jurisdiction of international political and 
financial ‘centres’ is exercised in a globalised world (e.g. Goldblum and Wong 2000; Ong 
2000) – a development that makes a significant contribution to our understanding of political 
economy. Yet the character of the centre-periphery relation within such work remains 
sketched in an analytically conservative way, as indeed it must if the endeavour of charting 
emergent new configurations of centre-periphery relations is to make any sense. As a 
consequence, however, the question of how precisely Riau Islanders and Singaporeans might 
imagine their mutual encounters is left aside, despite the crucial role that such perceptions 
play in shaping both lived experience in the region and the concrete outcomes of cross-border 
collaborations (Long 2013: 201-204).  
 A second body of literature has paid more attention to the mutability of relations 
between Indonesia’s centre and its peripheral regions, an issue of increasing significance 
once the post-Suharto regional autonomy laws offered up new opportunities for these 
relations to be recalibrated. However, the level at which such recalibration is investigated is 
typically a relatively formal, abstracted conception of the ‘balance of power’. Such an 
approach continues to assume an underlying antagonism between centre and periphery, as 
consistent with the structural Marxist model. The periphery has been conceptualised as 
resentful of the way its resources were being expropriated by its centre, of the heavy-handed 
imposition of centrally appointed bureaucrats to manage regional affairs, and of the cultural 
hegemony that typically accompanied this (Diprose 2009: 108-111; Kimura 2010: 426). 
From this point of view, decentralisation – as well as the flourishing of regional-level 
democracy that it was believed to inculcate – serves as a means of ensuring the longevity of 
the Indonesian nation-state. By relieving long-standing tensions through a rebalancing of 
power, and giving the periphery relative autonomy, decentralisation was seen as ‘reconciling’ 
the regions with a ‘a centre that had systematically undermined their local identities since the 
1950s’ (Aspinall 2010: 22).  
This assessment remains the most dominant metanarrative of centre-periphery 
relations within contemporary Indonesian Studies. It is not without its merits, and illuminates 
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many of the social and political struggles that took place in the early years of Reformasi, both 
within and outside the Riau Islands. The separatist movement Riau Merdeka, for example, 
premised its legitimacy on correcting the injustice that had led oil-rich Riau to be the second 
poorest province in Sumatra, despite generating an estimated 20 per cent of Indonesia’s total 
wealth (Long 2013: 47). Analysing a parallel separatist movement amongst Malay-Bugis 
aristocrats in the Riau Islands,2 Vivienne Wee (2002: 500) notes that the movement was 
underpinned by a resentment of the cultural hegemonies visited upon the region by Jakarta, 
coupled with a ‘logic of power’ in which the periphery paid formal lip service to the official 
narratives promulgated by the centre, whilst preserving in informal spaces of everyday life a 
second narrative, inspired by memories of the precolonial sultanate, that could form the basis 
of an alternative sovereignty movement. Even away from the spheres of formally organised 
separatism, informants would sometimes tell me of how their province had placed too much 
faith in the central administration provided by Jakarta and would benefit from having a 
greater degree of autonomy over its own affairs. I encountered such sentiments most 
frequently amongst members of the civil service, who would have encountered constraints 
being placed upon their own agency by regulations coming from the centre. The dominant 
metanarrative of decentralisation is thus far from irrelevant to the Riau Islands case, but it is 
only one – highly situated – imaginary of what was involved in lobbying to become a new 
province. For many Riau Islanders, a somewhat different set of issues was at stake.  
 As noted by Booth (2011), Quinn (2003) and Kimura (2007, 2010), many of the 
political movements set in motion by the decentralisation process were directed not at Jakarta 
but rather at attempting to secure autonomy from regional centres. Examples include the 
creation of new provinces in Gorontalo, West Sulawesi and Banten, and the calls for greater 
autonomy in Madura, Luwu, and Toraja. In Kimura’s (2007: 72) view, such movements can 
best be understood as responses to a condition of ‘marginality in the periphery’, in which a 
population feels held back by the actions of their regional government, and thus at a 
disadvantage in terms of infrastructure, economic opportunities, services and skills, compared 
to other members of the same district, regency, or province. In some cases the regional centre 
might be considered guilty of discriminatory practice towards those under its jurisdiction on 
the basis of their ethnicity and/or religion: a condition experienced by the Gorontalese with 
reference to the administration offered from Manado, in North Sulawesi (Kimura 2007: 74-
85). A sense of ‘marginality in the periphery’ could also emerge from a centre’s perceived or 
actual failures to invest in a province’s remote outer regions. Both such themes were evident 
in the Riau Islands, where there was widespread dissatisfaction with the region’s 
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administration from the Mainland Sumatran city of Pekanbaru, which my informants told me 
was dominated by Mainland Sumatran ethnic groups and had preferentially invested in 
mainland development projects rather than the archipelagic Malay heartlands, leaving the 
islands – which had once been a vibrant and wealthy region of Indonesia – little more than a 
stagnant backwater. Thus, although some actors in the islands (such as the Malay-Bugis 
aristocrats mentioned above) hoped that the archipelago might become as free from 
Indonesian rule as possible,3 the majority simply wanted to be free of interference from 
Pekanbaru. It was to this effect that a campaign to create a new province was initiated. As a 
result, we should be cautious about seeing the enthusiastic embrace of decentralisation laws 
within the region as being a negative judgement of Jakarta as national centre. Not only does 
the creation of a new province require the active co-operation of political actors within the 
central government (Kimura 2010: 442) – it can also reflect a desire within the marginal 
periphery to get a greater degree of unmediated access to the national centre, which in many 
regards represents a powerful and desirable resource (Wollenberg et al. 2009: 7).4  
In short, decentralisation may not have been about pulling away from the centre so 
much as about engaging it more directly, and on more equal terms. Although this involved a 
tug away from the stymieing control of Pekanbaru, it would be a mistake to interpret the push 
to decentralise as an attempt to achieve a relatively high degree of self-determination vis-à-
vis the rest of Indonesia (cf. cases such as Aceh and Papua). My informants often saw it as a 
move towards a form of peripherality that was neither ‘marginal’ in terms of the social and 
economic wellbeing of its inhabitants, nor ‘marginal’ in the eyes of those who mattered – 
other Indonesian citizens, outsiders, and indeed the government at the centre.  
It could thus be perfectly logically consistent for Riau Islanders to celebrate regional 
autonomy and its achievements (infrastructural improvements were most widely cited on this 
front), and yet also hold a sense of responsibility towards, or a need to make claims upon, a 
‘centre’ – typically Jakarta, but sometimes Singapore. Such feelings were made particularly 
evident in discourses surrounding one of the most negative consequences of regional 
autonomy: the rise of self-serving local elites, often described as ‘little kings’ (raja kecil), 
who exploited their capacity to grant business tenders, and who issued contracts for bauxite 
mining that destroyed the natural beauty and heritage of the province, as well as endangering 
the livelihoods of regional fishing communities. These feelings of frustration were 
widespread, and typically resulted in impassioned calls for the central government to 
intervene over tables in coffee parlours and late night domino games. Sometimes journalists, 
outraged by the latest announcement of a bauxite extraction project, would go up to Regents 
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directly, and demand to see their letter of authorisation from the centre – a phantasmic 
enactment of the centralised authorities that were in fact not exercising the level of 
surveillance and discipline of the periphery that islanders wished they would. The Regent’s 
response – typically described as ‘falling silent’ or ‘fleeing the scene’ would then be relayed 
in tones of bitter pride to the journalists’ friends and colleagues, who would shake their heads 
and lament to each other, ‘That’s Indonesia!’ As all this took place, however, Riau Islanders 
were never hoping for a return to the old days of ‘centralisation’. Rather, the right to make 
such claims on the central government was itself a valuable part of what decentralisation had 
involved for them. 
 
The Affective Life of a Periphery 
As the examples just sketched make clear, the failure of the centre to comply with islanders’ 
expectations generated strong emotions.  Such affective dimensions of centre-periphery 
relations has received little attention in the literature, and yet I found it to be one of the most 
productive ways of understanding the deep-seated investments that Indonesians who, on the 
surface, had very little to say about matters of national politics might nevertheless have 
towards the central government and to their own status as inhabitants of the Outer Islands 
within the nation-state. One of the reasons these emotional responses proved such a profitable 
source of insight was that they prompted people to move beyond the conventional ways of 
thinking and talking about centre-periphery relations, and to instead articulate their feelings 
and about and emotional investments in particular configurations of the political. In this 
section, I discuss two such cases and reveal how each of them portray a normative vision of 
life under decentralisation that does not revolve around detachment and autonomy, but rather 
a repositioned form of deep engagement with both national and transnational ‘centres’.  
 
Sri’s story 
A Javanese woman in her late forties who had settled in the Riau Islands after a period living 
overseas, Sri sustained her household through a variety of freelance businesses, including 
some work accompanying high-status dignitaries from Singapore to appointments around the 
islands. She told me of the time she had been asked to drive a group of Singaporean officials 
to a seminar that they had sponsored, which aimed to teach Kepri’s civil servants about the 
latest innovations in healthcare policy. Since their office had paid for the whole event, 
including the hire of a luxury hotel and a free meal for all participants, the Singaporeans were 
shocked to discover that most of the Kepri civil servants who attended had asked them 
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whether it would be possible to receive any ‘pocket money’ (uang saku) to compensate them 
for their time. Such payments are a common feature of seminars in the Riau Islands, but the 
requests took the Singaporean visitors by complete surprise. When they got back to Sri’s car, 
they animatedly recounted the events of the previous morning. 
One dignitary described how he had rebuked an Indonesian who had asked him for 
money. ‘No,’ he had replied! ‘The Singaporean government does not pay fees.’ His 
colleagues had tutted in horror. ‘You know,’ another man had concluded, ‘I don’t know what 
is wrong with these Indonesians!’ 
 All the time, Sri had felt her face darkening, a wave of intense shame (malu) 
sweeping over her. How could these officials have asked for pocket money when they were 
turning up to a free event that had been staged to help them?! Didn’t they realise they were 
bringing their whole country into disrepute? A Singaporean caught her eye in the rear mirror. 
‘You can understand English, can’t you Sri?’ he had asked her, ‘You listen to this.’  
 At the time, Sri had found the experience excruciating. The way in which her client 
had spoken of ‘these Indonesians’ was so dismissive, so generalising. And yet, who could 
blame him?! The officials he had met had behaved in terrible ways. It was then that she 
began to realise just how important it was that people in Kepri make a good impression. As a 
border province it was Kepri that overseas visitors would arrive in first; it was their 
experience of the Riau Islands that would shape their images of the whole nation, of the 
country that she loved.  She came to realise that the province was the ‘gateway’ (pintu) of 
Indonesia; it had to be up to national standard. 
 The rhetoric of Kepri as a national ‘gateway’ was, by the time of my conversation 
with Sri, very widespread – especially with reference to the idea that the region was a 
‘gateway’ for international tourists. But the corollary to this, keenly felt by Sri and many 
others to whom I spoke, was that it was vital that this gateway be impressive. As they 
understood the situation, visitors like the Singaporeans were not viewing the problematic 
behaviour of Kepri’s officials as a reflection of the continuing marginality of Indonesia’s 
Outer Islands periphery. Far from it – visitors would see it as a reflection of the 
characteristics of Indonesia as a nation, with features and dispositions that were believed to 
stretch throughout the nation with only negligible variations in evenness. Such fears were not 
unwarranted, as an equivocation of the Riau Archipelago with the nation is a common 
discursive manoeuvre in Singaporean commentary on the islands. Riau Island officials who 
showed low discipline and poor human resource quality often become ciphers for 
‘Indonesians’ writ large, as in the case that Sri recounted. Meanwhile, a particularly mean-
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spirited article by Tan Wee Cheng, an adjunct professor working at the NUS Business 
School, reveals how the very feel of Tanjung Pinang – a town he describes as looking ‘dirty, 
messy and simply evil’ (Tan 2004: 2) synecdochally evokes an image of Indonesia as a 
nation: 
 
“Mister! Mister, listen to me!” the Indonesian touts swarmed over us the moment 
we walked out of the jetty complex. Offering anything from “beachside” hotel 
accommodation in inland locations to deep fried fish chips [sic], these touts were a 
sudden reminder that we were no longer in First World Singapore but in a vast 
country with fifty times the population yet one-eighth the GDP per capita (Tan 
2004: 1). 
 
The modernity, development, discipline and high human resource quality that Riau Islanders 
imagined characterised life in the centre (i.e. Java) was thus not just something that they felt 
they were owed by the national government, but also something which it was their duty to 
cultivate. It would be in their own personal interests, as well as upholding – even improving – 
the image of their nation. This normative position was not derived from first principles or 
abstract reflection – it emerged viscerally, grounded in their apprehension of the gaze of their 
visitors and the profound shame and discomfort at the messages they saw their province to be 
communicating. As Sri’s case illustrates clearly, the emotions that were evoked by 
synecdochal equivocations between the Riau Islands and Indonesia are not only evidence of 
latent attachment to the centre and to the nation, but served to imbue particular configurations 
of what it meant to be a periphery with personal meaning (Chodorow 1999) and normative 
force. Far from being a backwater clamouring to have their voices heard, it was precisely 
their status as an ‘Outer Islands’ province on the geographic periphery of the state that 
allowed Riau Islanders to imagine their region as integral to the reputation and international 
standing of the nation. 
 
Gunawan’s Story 
Such aspirations were particularly strong when it came to ‘human resource quality’, interest 
in which has been burgeoning nationwide as the Indonesian government seeks to ensure that 
its human resources are ‘globally competitive’, so as to secure a prestigious ranking in much-
scrutinised international ranking exercises such as the UNDP’s Human Development Index, 
attract foreign direct investment, and cultivate an autochthonous entrepreneurial class. Riau 
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Islanders, like Indonesians from all provinces, were entranced by the prospect of being 
‘world-class’, and by the cosmopolitan possibilities that such high levels of human resource 
quality might offer them. But the issue also spoke to deeper concerns. Opponents to 
provincial secession had regularly cited the poor quality of the region’s human resources as a 
reason to block the creation of an autonomous province; many in the archipelago thus felt 
compelled to prove to the rest of Indonesia that separation from Pekanbaru had allowed the 
islands’ human resources to flourish. As a result, considerable interest was taken in inter-
provincial competitions – ranging from school-level contests such as maths and science 
Olympiads to the regular Miss Indonesia and Qur’anic recitation contests (MTQ). In all of 
these, representatives from Kepri could compete against participants from across Indonesia in 
a bid to be crowned national champion and even earn the right to represent Indonesia on the 
international stage. Riau Islanders spoke avidly of how much they wanted to show their 
countrymen that they were of ‘international standard’, and many dreamed of the idea that 
they – even though they were from a backwater periphery – might be able to represent 
Indonesia to the world.  
 Such undertakings, however, were far from straightforward. One of the major 
challenges facing the province’s population was their sense that the region continues to be 
deeply scarred by the legacy of having been Pekanbaru’s periphery for over forty years. A 
pervasive perception that the region had long been ‘held back’ by its former centre meant that 
even after the creation of the new province had led to formal powers between Pekanbaru and 
Tanjung Pinang (the capital of Kepri) being rendered equivalent, there was still a widespread 
sense of inferiority amongst Riau Islanders when comparing themselves to the population of 
Mainland Riau and other regions of Indonesia. This was especially evident in contexts 
associated with ‘human resource quality’, where Riau Islanders saw their current quality as 
fundamentally compromised by the legacies of neglect that they and their region had received 
in prior decades. Teams representing Kepri in inter-provincial contests desperately wanted to 
beat Mainland Riau, their former ‘coloniser’, but were simultaneously terrified by the 
prospect of meeting teams from regions seen as advanced – including Pekanbaru, but also 
Bali, South Sulawesi, and all the provinces in Java – because of their conviction that such 
teams would visit upon them a defeat of humiliating proportions (Long 2013: 188-192). 
Indeed, their levels of anxiety were often so strong that they suffered sleepless nights before 
competition play-offs, with the result that their fears of defeat became self-fulfilling 
prophecies.   
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When I met with Pak Gunawan, a Sundanese man in his early forties who was now 
the head of a prestigious vocational school in Batam, these were issues with which he was 
extremely familiar. Gunawan was an educator almost obsessed with the category of 
achievement – prestasi in Indonesian. He explained to me that the whole point of prestasi 
was that it was something that one ‘would do absolutely anything to get’: it had to ‘be 
reached for as hard as possible’, and this meant that an educational institution such as his own 
had to devise ‘all sorts of strategies’ for obtaining it. The school management was thus 
oriented towards scrutinising the particular strengths of individual students and then pushing 
those as far as possible, ‘so that [their strengths] could then be competed at (dilombakan) and 
[the students] can become champions (dapat juara)’. Yet despite this outlook, and a 
formidable track record of success, Gunawan’s pupils still suffered from crippling fear of 
failure. 
Teachers at the school all agreed: even mentioning the prospect of encountering 
Jakarta at a national level competition would be enough to ‘make students’ chests heave in 
terror’ at what they might have to come up against. This frustrated Gunawan, for whom it 
made no sense that his students should feel such fear when ‘amongst other provinces, Kepri 
is known as a province to beat’. Various members of staff proceeded to reel off a catalogue of 
cases in which this fear had led to self-defeating behaviour on the parts of their pupils, 
describing students who had performed very well in the provincial contests and in training 
sessions but who then imploded in the national finals.  
I asked Gunawan what he thought might account for this self-defeating behaviour. He 
offered several possible explanations, all of which were linked to what might be described as 
a ‘mindset of marginality’. In some cases, he thought, the long-distance air travel involved in 
attending national finals could be a contributing factor. ‘Sometimes kids from here don’t 
have much experience of the world,’ he elaborated, ‘We had a kid last year who wanted to go 
to the finals of the LKS [Lomba Kompetensi Siswa; Students’ Competency Competition], but 
he was scared to even get in the plane. He’d never flown before. So before he’d even arrived 
at the contest, his heart was no longer calm.’ Other cases were more explicitly linked to a 
vocabulary of centre-periphery relations. ‘[The students] still feel they’re from a hinterland 
region, to the extent they maybe think they’re behind other regions, they’re a long way from 
the centre, they arrive and see Jakarta and how big its buildings are, and they start to get 
scared.’ 
It is important at this point to emphasise that the issue Gunawan has identified is not 
one of objective differentials in technical competency: pupils from the Riau Islands have 
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already managed to achieve a number of impressive successes in the vocational competitions, 
and Gunawan’s assessment that the province is regarded as ‘one to beat’ is not inaccurate. 
Although there may be fewer highly skilled pupils in the Riau Islands competing for the 
opportunity to represent their province, those who are successful – especially those who have 
had the benefit of studying in a well-resourced and highly selective school such as 
Gunawan’s – are at no substantial disadvantage compared to their metropolitan peers. What 
is at stake in the anxiety faced by Gunawan’s pupils is thus not a condition of contemporary 
structural marginality – as a more political economic view of centre-periphery relations might 
have it – but rather a specific social imaginary of how the Riau Islands’ human resource 
quality compares to that evident in Jakarta; a legacy of the marginality that the area did 
indeed once experience, the memory and narrative of which continues to cast a shadow over 
its early decentralised days.5  
‘So now I have a new strategy,’ Gunawan continued. ‘We need to have a concept for 
training our kids as well as possible, to build their resilience (mental) and make them more 
daring (lebih berani). They’re scared of Jakarta. Okay. I’ll take them to Singapore. To 
Malaysia as well. But above all to Singapore. We’ll wander around, see the sights. If there’s 
time, maybe we’ll do a comparative study (studi banding), but what matters is that we see the 
sights. 
 ‘The school got passports for them all, so they could see what Singapore is like – a 
fantastic city, that is so close, that they’re able to experience and enjoy whenever they like.6 
That’s what becomes their focus. They will be Kids Who Often Go To Singapore. Kids who 
often go to a place that’s better than Jakarta. Then, when they arrive in Jakarta, they’ll no 
longer be afraid. They’ve already seen somewhere that’s truly outstanding – really opulent 
and tidy. Then they see Jakarta: 
 ‘“Oh, this is nothing special,” they’ll say, “I’m already used to Singapore.” 
 ‘That’s my strategy to get the kids to enjoy the atmosphere here in Batam and to build 
their strength of will.’ 
Although only one dimension of Gunawan’s strategy for achieving outstanding results 
in national competitions (which extended to intensive training regimes and subliminal 
motivation by professional hypnotherapists), the trips to Singapore are particularly interesting 
in the context of this chapter, given Gunawan’s emphasis on overcoming a ‘hinterland’ 
mentality through the manipulation of affect. In his diagnosis, the metropolitan trappings of 
the Jakarta landscape elicit feelings of shock that are interpreted according to an imaginary of 
centre-periphery relations that has long enjoyed public circulation – one which sees the centre 
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as developed and advanced, and the periphery as necessarily inferior. Students’ negative 
notions of the provincial self harden in response to these affective cues, in ways that threaten 
their performance. Interestingly, his response to this is not to challenge the structure of his 
students’ interpretations, for example by reassuring them that they can be credible 
competitors to national level teams. Instead, he seeks to change the very affects that are 
elicited by encounters with Jakarta’s urban landscape. Trips to Singapore tap into the same 
affective register of awe that students’ arrival in Jakarta would, but with the emphasis on this 
being a fun trip where the purpose is, above all, to ‘see the sights’, this awe is turned into not 
terror but wonder. Through the visits, pupils are encouraged to see themselves as part of 
Singapore’s periphery, rather than Jakarta’s. Trips to Jakarta can then take place in full 
confidence, both because students have become habituated to and comfortable within a centre 
that is thought to shine even brighter than the national capital, and also because they have 
come to realise that they are ‘so close’ to Singapore that their own position in Batam is hardly 
one of the marginality or extreme peripherality they might otherwise have assumed.  
 How significant these trips really are for the pupils at Gunawan’s school is debatable. 
Members of the highly successful mechatronics team accorded them only cursory 
significance, praising the dedication of their teachers, the high volume of training they had 
received and the excellent facilities in the school as the most important factors that 
underpinned their success. On the other hand, the trips were never designed to propel an 
achieving mindset, but rather to prevent a counterproductive form of fear from being 
experienced, and are thus interventions that the students themselves may not be best-placed 
to evaluate. What is clear, however, is that at the level of emergent institutional theories of 
achievement psychology, students’ imaginaries of how Kepri, as a particular kind of 
periphery, relates to the centres of Singapore and Jakarta, has been seen as central to the 
outcomes students achieve, whilst also amenable to intervention. Moreover, this intervention 
is not made in structural terms, but in ways that are bodily, experiential, and affective.  
 
Conclusion 
Studies of decentralisation and centre-periphery relations in Indonesia all too often focus on 
questions of resource flow or the ‘balance of power’ as if these were the terminal points of a 
social analysis. Clearly they are significant: decentralisation has led to very tangible changes 
in infrastructure and institutional practice, setting conditions of possibility for all the events 
discussed in this chapter. For example, while Gunawan felt that decentralisation had actually 
played ‘very little part’ in improving the human resource quality on Batam (he attributed the 
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high quality to the self-propulsive values that circulated in a city of economic migrants), it 
was clear that his own school had benefitted considerably from being identified as a flagship 
institution by the provincial government.   
However, what I have hoped to demonstrate is that such structural changes are 
important only insofar as they lead to new conditions of possibility in which inhabitants of 
the Outer Islands might be able to pursue the forms of life that are most desirable to them. 
The question of what mode of life is desired and why thus stands out as a pressing matter for 
ethnographic investigation, rather than something that should be assumed on the basis of a 
theoretical model. In the Riau Islands, citizens’ desires frequently involve relating to the 
centre in new ways so as to be a new kind of (non-marginal) periphery, rather than aspiring to 
become a centre, or longing for a condition of autonomy. Anxieties about marginality and the 
legacies of past neglect combine with an appreciation of the duties and opportunities that the 
region might bear as a geographic periphery: but in both cases what seems to be at issue is an 
intense desire for national parity, underpinned by a desire for full inclusion within the nation 
– and increasingly, desire for full membership of ‘the global’. The recalibration of centre-
periphery relations is consequently an affectively and ethically charged concern.  
This strong level of personal investment in the political, I suggest, is precisely why 
my enquiries into centre-periphery relations tended to yield emotionally charged accounts of 
outrage, shame, or distress – and why Gunawan felt that forging affective bonds between his 
students and the metropolitan centre of Singapore could prove such an effective means of 
remedying the self-handicapping tendencies that were holding back his own desires for his 
school. Given the emphasis that the literature on decentralisation continues to place on the 
actions and motivations of self-interested elites – as if their supporters are simply held in 
thrall to their ambitions by similarly self-interested practices of clientelism – it is 
theoretically sobering to reflect on the intense passions that normative questions of centre-
periphery relations continue to elicit, as well as to recognise that it was precisely the desire to 
connect more directly with a beloved national centre that led many Riau Islanders to embrace 
the prospect of provincial autonomy in the first place.   
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Notes
                                                 
1
 Vina’s narrative finds echoes in the works of Carole Faucher (2005, 2007) and Vivienne 
Wee (2002), while Pak Iman’s concerns have been widely recognised as affecting 
Indonesia’s resource extraction industries on a nation-wide scale (see e.g. Casson and 
Obidzinski 2002; Spiegel 2012). 
 
2
 Aristocrats descended from the viceroys of the Riau-Lingga sultanate self-define as ‘pure 
Malays’, whilst nevertheless tracing their patrilineal descent to Bugis seafarers who arrived in 
the Riau Islands during the eighteenth century. For further discussion of this complex 
‘Malay-Bugis’ identity, see Long (2013: 70-97). 
 
3
 These aristocrats had a direct incentive to advocate such a position since they envisaged 
themselves as being, by birthright, the future leaders of the prospective Republic of Riau. 
 
4
 Note also that earlier anthropological accounts of the ‘exemplary centre’ stressed the 
desirability of access to a ‘potent centre’. Proximity to such a source offered opportunities for 
cultivating one’s own potency (Errington 1983), as well as the comforting, and yet also 
dangerously distracting, prospect of being ‘enveloped in a superior authority’s care’ (Keeler 
1987: 202). Relations with the centre were thus ambivalent, prompting a complex ethics of 
detachment and engagement. Contrast this with more recent attempts to use ‘cultural’ models 
of potency as a gloss for structural descriptions of centre-periphery relations. Phelps (2004), 
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for instance, uses Anderson’s (1972) famous image of a cone of light to emphasise the 
darkness (and thus marginality) of the periphery – an interpretation that remains in thrall to 
structural models, and radically underplays the complex tensions and ambivalences that 
characterised the culturalist model. 
 
5
 In some other cases, these two concerns exist in tandem (Long 2013: 190-191). 
 
6
 Notwithstanding the immigration restrictions on visitors from Indonesia (Ford and Lyons 
2006: 262-263). 
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